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Abstract The Spanish debt consolidation between 1996 and 2007 represents, by its
size and duration, an impressive case among the European Union countries. This
paper aims at characterizing the Spanish debt consolidation process in order to assess
its effects on economic inequality and welfare. For that purpose we built a general
equilibrium heterogeneous-agent model capable of exploring the relationship between
fiscal policy variables and the endogenous cross-section distribution of income and
wealth. The results show a quite impressive positive welfare gain despite significant
transition costs. The simulations point to an increase of inequality during the initial
transition period, reversing to more compressed distributions as the economy evolves
to its final steady state equilibrium. Overall, the welfare gains are slightly biased
towards wealthier individuals. Furthermore empirical data on the dynamics of some
crucial variables during the consolidation period lend support to the model simulation
results.
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1 Introduction
The history of the Spanish public administration differs frommost of the other western
European economies, mainly due to the late establishment of a modern democratic
regime based on free elections and on the market-based economy system.1 From
this point of view, Spain’s recent experience is similar to other two Mediterranean
countries: Portugal and Greece.
The recent evolution of the Spanish public finances can be divided in two peri-
ods, before and after the establishment of democracy. During the dictatorship of
Franco, public expenditure grew slowly but steadily, impelled by the 1959 Stabi-
lization Plan, which was a first attempt to open and liberalize the Spanish economy.2
Concerning the structure of expenditure growth, the major effort was related to public
infrastructures and to the development of a social security system. This period was
also characterized by strong economic growth (interrupted in 1973 with the first oil
shock) and balanced budgets which led to a public debt-to-output-ratio of 12.5 % in
1974.
Throughout the democratic period, we can distinguish two phases. The first phase
between 1975 and 1985, corresponds to the development and consolidation of the
welfare state. The second phase begins with a first period of fiscal consolidation
initiatedwith the CEEmembership in 1985 and interrupted by the economic and social
crisis in the beginning of the 1990s, and proceeds with a second fiscal consolidation
process (1996–2007)which is focused in our paper.Between1975 and1985, during the
transition to democracy, total public expenditure almost doubled from 23.5 to 41.6 %,
and public debt reached 43.7%ofGDP. The climb resulted from a succession of strong
deficits, low economic growth and also from the creation of the 17 autonomous regions
and the corresponding decentralization of a significant part of the public expenditure.3
The first period of debt consolidation (1986–1988) was mostly revenue-based and
led to a small reduction of the debt-to-output ratio. However, this fiscal adjustment
period ended by 1989, due, first, to the incapacity of government to sustain the growing
trend of expenditure resulting from strong social protests and, second, to the economic
crisis in the beginning of the 1990s. Budget deficit peaked at 7 % of GDP in 1993
and the debt-to-output ratio reached 66.82 % of GDP in 1996. The second period of
consolidation (1996–2007), by its size and duration, represents an impressive case
among the European Union (UE) countries. After a consolidation attempt in 1992,
aborted in 1993, andhaving as horizon theEuropean andMonetaryUnionmembership,
theSpanish authorities entailed an ambitious planof reformsbasedon several structural
aspects, namely a containment of social expenditure (by tightening eligibility criteria
for several social benefit such as unemployment and sickness compensation, among
1 The dictator Franco died in 20/11/1975, the first election occurred in 15/06/1977 and the new constitution
was voted the 27/12/1978.
2 For a comprehensive review about the history of the Public Administration in Spain see de Cos et al.
(1999) and Fernandez (2005).
3 All policy measures taken during this period resulted from an ample agreement between the most repre-
sentative political parties and trade unions about wages, employment and social security, signed in October
1977 and known as the Moncloa Pact.
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others), a reduction of the wage bill while maintaining high levels of public investment
together with the implementation of legal and institutional changes aiming at higher
budgetary discipline (European-Commission 2007). This effort has also benefited from
a favorable macroeconomic environment with high growth rates and a significant drop
in interest rates.
This paper aims at characterizing the debt consolidation processes put forward
by the Spanish authorities between 1996 and 2007, in order to assess welfare
and, in particular, the inequality effects involved. For that we built a general equi-
librium heterogeneous-agent model capable of exploring the relationship between
fiscal policy variables and the endogenous cross-section distribution of income and
wealth.
We use a dynastic heterogeneous-agent model that includes a continuum of
infinitely-lived rational agents who are hit by idiosyncratic wage shocks in an incom-
plete capital market, following seminal works by Bewley (1983), Imrohoroglu (1989),
Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1995), among others. The model, based on Aiyagari
andMcGrattan (1998) and Floden (2001), includes government and the corresponding
dynamic budget constraint. Besides including taxes levied on labour and capital, we
additionally decompose government expenditure into transfers to private sector, and
productive and unproductive spending.While productive expenditure is included in the
production function and, through this channel, increases the global productivity of the
economy, unproductive spending is only utility-augmenting. The model also includes
optimizing firms endowed with a neoclassical Cobb-Douglas production function and
optimizing households that accumulate savings during “good times” while spending
them during “bad times”.
The analysis of a debt consolidation process requires a transition between two
steady states. Thus, besides steady-state analysis, transition paths are crucial for the
computation of welfare effects and inequality. In order to simulate the transition paths
imposed by a debt consolidation strategy, we follow the methodology of Rios-Rull
(1999) and Mendoza et al. (2009). The simulations are conducted under an open
economy framework, assuming the existence of a global market for assets and, hence,
a common interest rate. This international mobility of capital implies that each country
may have either a positive, negative or balanced foreign asset position.
Collecting Spanish data from the AMECO database, we apply the criteria proposed
by Alesina and Perotti (1995) in order to detect the successful debt consolidation
processes between 1990 and 2010. Secondly, consolidation episodes are identified as
active if a permanent debt reduction results mainly from the control of the cyclically-
adjusted primary deficit. Third, we further analyze the composition of the cyclically-
adjusted primary deficit in order to detect the main sources of consolidation. Fourth
and finally, we use our model to mimic the Spanish consolidation processes while
assessing the welfare and inequality costs involved.
The paper is organized as follows. TheSpanish consolidation strategies are analyzed
in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3 we describe the model, and define the social (aggregate) welfare
metric. We proceed with the simulations and discuss the main results in Sect. 4, and
conclusions are drawn in Sect. 5.
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2 Identification of the consolidation strategies
In order to characterize debt consolidation processes in Spain, we proceed following
the approach in the seminal paper by Alesina and Perotti (1995) which identifies
“significant fiscal impulses” in OECD countries between 1960 and 1992, in order to
study the determinants of “successful” budget consolidation processes. In particular,
they define “significant” changes in fiscal policy stance using a cyclically adjusted
measure of government primary balance and set several cut-off points. Moreover, a
fiscal adjustment in year t is defined as “successful” if the gross debt/GDP ratio in
year t + 3 is at least 5 % points lower than in year t .
In our approach, we apply the criteria used by Alesina and Perotti (1995), but
proceed backwards to detect all episodes of “successful” debt consolidation in Spain
between 1990 and 2010.We start by identifying the periodswhere debt-to-output ratios
are, at least, 5 % points below the value observed 3 years before. Then, we proceed
with identifying the determinants leading to such positive debt dynamics - cyclically
adjusted primary deficit, snow-ball and stock-flow adjustments (formore details on the
definitions, see European-Commission 2009). Consolidation episodes are identified
as active if the reduction in the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit dominates. We
further analyze the budget composition in order to detect the main sources of primary
balance adjustment. Finally, we use our model to mimic each consolidation process
while assessing the welfare costs involved.
Figure 1 shows the Spanish debt dynamics. The light columns show the debt level
ant the dark columns show the debt variation (dt − dt−3). From 1990 to 2010, we
identify nine successive episodes in which the successful criteria verifies, starting at
1996 and ending in 2007. From 1996 to 2007, the debt-to-output ratio decreased from
66.82 to 36.24 %.
In order to extract (active) fiscal consolidation processes, we decompose debt
dynamics as usual (see, among others, European-Commission 2009):


































Debt (3-year) debt change
Fig. 1 Debt dynamics: Spain (1990–2010). Source European-Commission (2009) and AMECO database
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Fig. 2 Different contribution to debt reduction: Spain (1996–2007). Source European-Commission (2009)
and AMECO database
Table 1 Contributions to the overall debt reduction: Spain (1996–2007)
Country Debt reduction PD(adj) PD(cycle) SB SF
Spain 31.18 (1996–2007) −19.38 −6.48 −11.17 +6.14
Source: European-Commission (2009) and AMECO database
where, D stands for government debt, PD for general government primary deficit, SF
for the stock-flow adjustment and i for nominal interest rate paid by the government.
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where Yn is GDP at current market prices and n stands for the corresponding growth
rate. The first term of the right part in Eq. 2.2 refers to the snow-ball effect (SB).
Figure 2 shows, for the whole period, the debt decomposition into primary deficit
(PD), snow-ball (SB) and stock-flow adjustments (SFA) as presented in Eq. 2.2, but
distinguishing between cyclically adjusted and cyclical components of primary deficit.
Table 1 presents the cumulative values of each effects (in % of GDP, including the
cyclical (PD(cycle)), and cyclically-adjusted (PD(adj)) components of primary deficit)
for the whole consolidation period. During the study period, Spain has enjoyed a good
economic conjuncture with high economic growth and low interest rates. In this sense,
Domingo et al. (2014) document the importance of the fiscal effort of the government,
giving ample emphasis to a combination of economic growth, low interest rate and
inflation. Accordingly, our results show that snow-ball effects associated with the
cyclical component of primary deficit are responsible by a cumulative debt reduction
of 18.04%points. Still, according to the samedata presented inTable 1,we can identify
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Tax Burden Final Cons. Social Transf. Gross Inv.
Fig. 3 Spanish cyclically-adjusted primary deficit components (% of GDP): tax burden and final consump-
tion (left-hand scale); social transfer other than in kind and gross fixed capital formation (right-hand scale).
Source European-Commission (2009) and AMECO database
the Spanish fiscal adjustment as an active consolidation process, since debt reduction
process was also driven by the control over the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit.
For a debt-to-output reduction of 31.18 % points, the cyclically-adjusted primary
deficit accounts for a reduction of 19.38 % points.4 Finally, stock-flow adjustments
are responsible for an increase of debt of 6.24 % points.
To characterize the cyclically-adjusted budget deficit reduction, the model consid-
ers a single instrument on the revenue side, the tax burden, and three instruments on
the expenditure side: final consumption, social transfers other than in kind and gross
capital formation, as in European-Commission (2009). Figure 3 exhibits accordingly
the cyclically-adjusted actual evolution of each of the four fiscal instruments. Spending
was adjusted for the cyclical component by applying the elasticity of total expenditure
(excluding interest rate) relative to the cycle to all items. Similarly, for the tax bur-
den, we used the total government revenue elasticity. Elasticities were calculated from
the AMECO Database series. During the whole consolidation process, we can see a
decrease in social transfers, along with a slight increase in public investment. On the
other side, the tax burden increased especially during the second-half part of the adjust-
ment. Table 2 summarizes the initial (1996) and final (2007) values (% GDP) for each
of the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit components and for the debt-to-output ratio.
Summing up, and according to the data in Fig. 3 and Table 2, the Spanish consolida-
tion is identified as a mixed strategy based on taxes (especially during the second half
period) and a reallocation of social transfer towards public investment expenditure.
4 We used the cyclically adjusted primary based on potential GDP. If we use the adjusted series based on
the trend GDP, the results are similar, with the primary deficit cyclically adjusted accounting for a debt
decrease of 21.41 % points.
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Table 2 Characterization of the Spanish consolidation strategy (1996–2007)
Initial values (1996) Final values (2007)
dt trt gu gp dt trt gu gp
67.48 13.50 17.50 3.10 36.30 11.60 17.50 3.80
Source: European-Commission (2009) and AMECO database
3 Model
Themodel is built from a standard growthmodel modified to include a role for govern-
ment togetherwith anuninsured idiosyncratic risk and liquidity/ borrowing constraints.
We rely on the original models of Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) and Floden (2001)
modified to break government expenditure into productive and unproductive. While
the former is taken to be utility augmenting through inclusion in the utility function,
the productive expenditure is considered as input to the production function. We also
use a different approach for the calibration of the idiosyncratic shock.
We set up an open economy framework composed by two countries or regions,
indexed by i . Both blocks are identical except for the size and for the path of the
fiscal policy instruments. Capital flows freely across borders while labour, instead, is
assumed not to flow across countries. We take Spain as the domestic block, with a
corresponding weight measured by the Spanish GDP over the EU15 GDP, p. Like-
wise, the foreign (“rest of the world”) block, with weight (1 − p), includes all the
other EU15 countries (EU15-1) and is assumed to act passively to the debt reduction
process in Spain.
Each country/region is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived agents of unit
mass who receive after-tax wage payments, w, after-tax interest from savings, ra,
and transfers, tr , from the government. Following Barro (1973) and Floden (2001,
2003), we consider that, besides private consumption, c, and leisure, l, unproductive
government spending, gu , also contributes to households’ utility at decreasing returns
depending on a parameter, ϑ . In each period, agents are hit by idiosyncratic shocks,
et , which determines the productivity level. Borrowing is allowed only up to a certain
limit b and complete capital markets are ruled out. This implies that agents have to
ensure themselves by saving during “good times” (at+1 − at > 0) while, during “bad
times”, savings are negative (at+1 − at < 0). Each agent is endowed with one unit
of time and solves the double problem of choosing between labor and leisure, and






β t (u1(ct , lt ) + ϑu2(gut ))|a0, e0
]
(3.1)
Subject to the following budget constraint:
ct + at+1 = wt (1 − lt )et + (1 + rt )at + trt , ct ≥ 0, at ≥ −b (3.2)
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The household’s instant utility functions are specified as:
u1(ct , lt ) = c
1−μ
t exp(−(1 − μ)ζ(1 − lt )1+γ )
1 − μ (3.3)
where μ represents the degree of risk aversion, ζ is constant related to average labor
supply, and 1
γ




1 − μ (3.4)
The productivity shock, et , is an idiosyncratic shock that evolves stochastically over
time according to the following process: the natural logarithm of et is represented by
an AR(1) process with a serial correlation coefficient ρ and a standard deviation σ :
log(et ) = ρ log(et−1) + t (3.5)
Firms are characterized by a neoclassic production function. Output in each country,
Y , is produced using capital, K , labour, N , and productive government spending, Gp.
Yt = F(Kt , Nt , Gpt ) = (Kt )α(Nt )1−α(Gpt )η (3.6)
Productive government spending is identifiedwith the share of public gross investment
on output, in line with Barro (1990) and Aschauer (1989), and enters as an input to
private production.5
The parameters α and η represent, respectively, the output elasticities relative to
private capital and to productive government expenditure. The production function
exhibits constant returns to scale over private inputs but increasing returns over all
inputs. Assuming competitive markets of goods and inputs, private factors are paid
according to their marginal productivity and output is exhaustively distributed. Thus:
wt = (1 − τt )FN (Kt , Nt , Gpt ) (3.7)
rt = (1 − τt )(FK (Kt , Nt , Gpt ) − δ) (3.8)
where τ is a proportional income tax rate levied in each country on labour and capital
and δ is the depreciation rate of capital. We must point that the pre-tax level of interest
rate, r , is fixed in the international capital market.
Government promotes both productive and unproductive expenditures, collects
taxes and pays lump-sum transfers to households, facing the following budget con-
straint in real terms:
gut + gpt + trt + (r t + 1)dt − dt+1 = τt (1 − δkt ) (3.9)
5 In a seminal paper, Barro (1990) incorporates a public sector into a simple, constant return, model of
economic growth. The ratio of real public gross investment to real GDP is assumed to correspond to a
flow of services identified as the measure of infrastructure services and enters directly into the production
function.
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where, gpt , kt anddt represent respectively, public gross investment (productive expen-
diture), private capital and government debt as a percentage of output.
Finally, expression (3.10) represents the international asset market clearing con-
dition when the output-weighed sum of aggregate asset holdings in each country i ,
ai , equals the output-weighed sum of private capital demand plus public debt of both
countries (domestic country together with “the rest of the world” block). As before,










t + dit ), i = 1, 2. (3.10)
3.1 General equilibrium definition
Consider {r it , wit }∞t=0 a deterministic sequence of prices (interest rate and wage) and
{dit , giut , gipt , tr it }∞t=0 an exogenous sequence of government policy in each region i .
The problem of the agent in a recursive form can be written as:
V it (at , et ) = maxct ,lt ,at+1[U (ct , lt , gut ) + βEV
i
t+1(at+1, et+1)] (3.11)
Subject to (3.2) and (3.5).
The solution to the agent’s problem of each country delivers all agents decision
rules, namely for consumption, cit (et , at ), leisure, l
i
t (et , at ), and savings, a
i
t+1(et , at ).
These decision rules determine the evolution of the distribution of wealth over e and
a, denoted by λt (e, a).
As such, given an initial steady state characterized by a vector of equilibrium prices,
{r0, wi0}, and a stationary distribution, λi0(a, e) and a sequence of government policy{dit , giut , gipt , tr it }∞t=0 for each country/region i , the general equilibrium is defined by
sequences of: (i) agents decisions, {cit (at , et ), lit (at , et ), ait+1(at , et )}∞t=0; (ii) value
functions {V it (at , et )}∞t=0 (iii) prices, {rt , wit }∞t=1 and (iv) distributions {λit (at , et )}∞t=1.
Such that (a) agent decisions solve (3.11); (b) government budget constraint is ful-





i = ∑i pi (Kit (r) + Dit )
and
∫
et (1 − lit ) dλi = Ni , for all {t, i}; and (d) the sequences of λit (at , et )∞t=1 are
consistent with the initial steady states, the agent decision rules and the idiosyncratic
shock in each country i .6
3.2 Solving the model
In order to solve the transition paths imposedby theSpanish debt consolidation strategy
we closely follow Mendoza et al. (2009), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), Rios-Rull
(1999) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). We consider a planner who inherits at
time t a predetermined state vector, including initial debt-to-output ratio, and face a
sequence of fiscal parameters for each period within a given horizon in order to reach
6 Remember that rt must be equal for both countries given that complete financial integration holds.
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a new state vector that includes a previously announced target for the debt-to-output
ratio at the end of the planning period (De la Fuente 2000). As such, the trajectories of
public debt and fiscal parameters ({dit , giut , gipt , tr it }) in each region (Spain and “rest
of world”) are fixed exogenously. Taxes adjust according to the budget constraint.
The algorithm for solving the equilibrium transition path of the economy, given a
particular parameterization, typically proceeds in three stages (Auerbach andKotlikoff
1987). First we solve for the long-run initial steady state of the economy (before the
implementation of the fiscal consolidation strategy). Second, we solve for the long-
run steady state towards which the economy will converge after full-effects of the
fiscal consolidation. The initial and final steady state and depend on parameters fixed
ex-ante by the government and are calculated independently as in Viegas and Ribeiro
(2013b). Third, we solve for the transition path of the economy between the two steady
states.
In particular, the algorithm for running the third step follows Rios-Rull (1999) and
involves the following steps: (i) choose the sequences for the common interest rate and
for wages in both countries in each period of transition period rt and wit (i = 1, 2);
(ii) take the sequences wit (i = 1, 2) and rt and solve backwards the value functions
to simulate the whole transition for the economy, updating the distributions according
to agent’s decisions as to obtain sequences for aggregate asset demand and labour
supply; (iii) adjust the sequences in order to clear asset and labour markets for each
period of the transition path; (iv) repeat steps (ii) and (iii) until the three sequences
converge and all markets clear.
3.3 Social welfare computation
Theutilitarian socialwelfare,U , is defined as the solution of (3.1) across all households






β t u(ct , lt , Gut ) dλt (a, e) (3.12)
Since the utility function is concave, the utilitarian social welfare is influenced by the
distribution, and thus, higher inequality or uncertainty will reduce welfare. Consid-
ering a policy change that moves an economy from equilibrium A to equilibrium B,


















7 The solution is represented by a sequence of consumption and leisure to infinity {ct , lt }∞t=0.
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3.4 Calibration
Preferences μ is set at 1.5, a value of standard use in the literature. For γ , Floden
(2001) set it to 2 which is equivalent to a wage elasticity of labour supply equal to
0.5. For Spain, Burriel et al. (2010) estimate γ = 1.8 which corresponds to a wage
elasticity of labour supply around 0.56. Varga et al. (2014) also use a similar value
and set γ = 2.5. The parameter ζ is set in order to match an average labour supply of
around 0.3 (ζ = 9.145). Finally, for the preferences towards public goods and services
relative to private goods, the baseline calibration sets ϑ = 0.1 as most of the values
used in literature are rather small (see, among others, Ni 1995; Doménech and García
2002; Ganelli and Tervala 2010). Moreover this value makes the model outcomes in
terms of steady-state optimal debt compatible with average European data on fiscal
policy variables (see Viegas and Ribeiro 2013a).
Technology The production function is inspired in Barro (1990) to incorporate pro-
ductive government spending. For our baseline model we follow Aschauer (1989) and
set η = 0.3. For the capital share, Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) and Floden (2001)
set α = 0.3.8 We follow Fernandez and Mauro (2000) who estimate α = 0.4 for the
Spanish economy. This value is consistent with the adjusted wage share reported by
the AMECO database.
Discount factor and interest rateAccording to ourmodel, r = αk −δ.We set δ = 6.5%
as in Hernández and Mauleón (2005). The variable k represents the capital-to-output
ratio and the steady-state value is calibrated as to match the value of the capital to
output ratio of Spain.9 Thus, the steady-state value for the real interest rate yields
4.0 %, in a yearly base which implies β = 0.980.
GovernmentGovernments are characterized by a set of fiscal indicators {d, tr, gu, gp}.
Using the AMECO database, we calibrate policy variables as to match the Spanish
consolidation episodes that occurred between 1996 and 2007. Specific values were
already released throughout Sect. 2.10 For the countries weight, we set p = 0.0787
for Spain which represents the average Spanish output proportion in the GDP of the
EU15 between 1990 and 2010 and (1 − 0.0787) for the rest of the EU15 countries.
Idiosyncratic shock Following the procedure of Tauchen (1986), the idiosyncratic
shock is replicated as a first orderMarkov chain specificationwith seven states tomatch
a first order autoregressive representation as followed by, among others, Aiyagari
(1994). Aiyagari (1994), Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) and Floden (2001) draw on
empirical data for earnings and annual hours worked to set ρ and σ . Due to unavailable
empirical data, we follow a different procedure. Castaneda et al. (2003) calibrated
the values of the shocks and the transition matrix to match some selected moments
of income and wealth distribution. We set both parameters as to match the existing
inequality in Spain (measured by the disposable income Gini index). According to
8 In a recent paper D’Auria et al. (2010) estimated α = 0.35 for the EU15 over the period 1960–2003.
9 Source: AMECO database, k = 3.8.
10 See Table 2 above.
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the OECD Statistics, the disposable income Gini index varies between 0.35 and 0.31
during the period 1991–2008. Thus we set ρ = 0.8 and σ = 0.27 which leads to a
disposable income Gini index of around 0.33.
3.5 Robustness
In order to test the robustness of our results, we considered different values for crucial
parameters of the model. When agents become more risk-averse (μ), simulations
reveal a slight decrease in welfare gains. Wealth and income Gini indexes are globally
lower and the improvement on both distributions becomes less expressive. A lower
labor supply elasticity ( 1
γ
) induces a marginal decrease in the welfare gain, with no
significant effect on inequality. As for government unproductive spending (ϑ), we
simulate several consolidation strategies based on unproductive expenditures with
different values for the ϑ parameter. Naturally, the welfare gain increases (decreases)
as ϑ becomes lower (higher), although marginally with no effects on inequality.11
Finally, as the productivity of public investment (η) increases relative to the importance
of public consumption in household’s utility, the substitution of unproductive for
productive spending during a consolidation process delivers higher net welfare gains.
4 Assessment of the impacts on welfare and inequality
After having identified and classified the Spanish consolidation episodes in Sect. 2,
we proceed with the simulations using the model presented in Sect. 3. Debt and fis-
cal instruments other than taxes are adjusted to match the described consolidation
process.12 Tax rate is endogenous, adjusting to satisfy the government budget con-
straint. As for the “rest of the world” block, we use the average values for each fiscal
variables of the EU15-1 countries for the same period.
Figure 4 depicts the impulse responses of someof themain relevantmacroeconomic
variables to the simulated debt-consolidation effort. The dynamics of the macroeco-
nomic and inequality variables depend strongly on the instruments used during the
fiscal adjustment. As it can be seen, the tax effort implies a decrease in the after-tax
wage during the initial phase, depressing the disposable income (also affected by the
social transfer cuts).
Households work and save less pushing up the interest rate, which depresses the
private capital level and leads to a temporary recession. In the second phase, the econ-
omy evolves towards its final steady state: interest and tax rates decrease, converging
to a lower level relative to the initial steady state while disposable income, labour
supply and consumption converge to higher levels.
Concerning capital flows, Fig. 5 illustrates the asset demand and supply adjustments
that have occurred during the two different phases of debt consolidation. The first
11 Decreasing (increasing) ϑ , from 0.1 to 0 (0.2) induces an increase (decrease) in welfare gains by 12.5 %.
12 For each simulation we calibrate our model according to Sect. 2 using the values presented in Table 2
for debt and fiscal instruments.
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Fig. 4 Dynamics of macroeconomic variables during fiscal consolidation in Spain (1996–2007): Spain
(solid line) versus EU15-1 (dashed line). Note All variables are expressed in percentage variation
phase of consolidation is dominated by a significant asset demand decline leading to
an excess of asset supply and, thus, a decrease in net foreign asset position. Conversely,
during the second phase, the combination of an increase in disposable income together
with the accrued need for insurance due to social transfers cuts, leads to a growing
demand for asset holdings that ends up exceeding the initial steady state level causing
an excess of asset demand, supplied by foreign assets. Capital flows outward and Spain
improves its net foreign asset position.
Table 3 summarizes for the period of debt consolidation, the overall welfare gains
(transition plus steady-state), the magnitude of transition costs as a percentage of final
relative to initial steady-state welfare gain, the Welfare Gain Intensity (WGI) and the
Total Spending Cut (TSC). The WGI refers to the welfare gain per percentage point
of debt reduction while TSC measures the combined reduction in social transfers
and unproductive expenditure per percentage point of debt reduction. The Spanish
fiscal adjustment implies a net improvement of life-time consumption of about 20 %.
Despite the recession and the rise in inequality, the net welfare gain is positive given
that the increase in consumption that arises from the increase of labor income more
123
492 SERIEs (2015) 6:479–496


























Excess of asset supply
(a) Phase 1


























Excess of asset demand
(b) Phase 2
Fig. 5 International asset market
Table 3 Welfare analysis: Spanish debt consolidation
Debt reduction Welf. gain Trans cost WGI TSC
30.58 (1996–2007) 0.1935 0.2540 0.0063 0.0006
than offset the loss of leisure. Moreover, the final distribution of wealth and income
is more equitable. The transition costs represent about 25 % of the potential welfare
gain.13 These costs are strongly associated with the tax effort and the corresponding
disincentive effects on savings and labour supply. The values for the welfare gain
intensity (WGI) and the total spending cut (TSC) are relatively small proving that this
consolidation process was of a gradual nature.
Concerning inequality, both wealth and disposable income Gini indexes increase
during the first phase due to the cuts in transfer. In the second phase, as the economy
evolves towards its final steady state, wealth and disposable Gini indexes decrease
gradually to a final lower, steady-state levels (see Table 4). Thus, after an increase
in inequality during transition, fiscal consolidation entails improvements in the dis-
tribution of both wealth and income. This effect can be explained by a mechanism
operating through the labour market where the labour supply elasticity of wage is
higher among the richer. With increase net wages, the substitution effect dominates
for the richer, compressing the disposable income distribution. As such, the initial
period is dominated by an increase income inequality due to the transfer cut, output
decrease and tax increase. As the economy start to grow, the tax burden decreases, the
net salary increases and income inequality tends to reduce. Also, the improved wealth
distribution results from the higher marginal propensity to save of the poorer.
However, if we take a broader measure like the welfare distribution of the fiscal
adjustment, results are not as favorable. Figure 6 shows the welfare gain curve (solid
line) across wealth (asset holding); it also shows the initial distribution of wealth
(dashed line). The slight positive slope of thewelfare gain curve indicates that the richer
13 The potential welfare gain corresponds to the final steady-state level of welfare compared to the initial
steady state, without taking account for the transition period.
123
SERIEs (2015) 6:479–496 493
Table 4 Debt consolidation effects on inequality: Spain
Initial steady state Final steady state
WG IG WG IG
0.3410 0.3315 0.3222 0.3174
























Fig. 6 Welfare gains across wealth following debt consolidations in Spain
are the ones who benefit more from the consolidation episode. Viegas and Ribeiro
(2013b) have shown that the welfare distribution moves negatively with debt and
positively with transfer and unproductive expenditures while productive expenditures
are neutral. Decreasing social transfers as well as unproductive expenditures leads to
a worse welfare distribution. Differently, debt reduction should improve the welfare
distribution. Apparently, in terms of welfare inequality, transfer and unproductive
spending effects have dominated over the debt effect during the Spanish consolidation
process: despite debt reduction, welfare inequality across wealth increased (despite
the positive welfare gain for every household).
The definition of welfare includes consumption, leisure and unproductive expen-
ditures (public services). The global negative effect on the welfare distribution results
from the dynamics of all these individual variables affecting welfare. As shown in
Fig. 4, both disposable income and wealth Gini indexes present an humped shaped
curve before converging to lower final levels (see, also, Table 4).
In order to make a simple test on the robustness of our results, we have collected
data on actual disposable income Gini coefficient (Fig. 7) and on the net foreign asset
(NFA) position (Fig. 8) for Spain, during the consolidation process. Although income
distribution depends on the dynamics of multiple variables, some of which are missing
from our model, the initial humped shaped curve and the afterwards downward path
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Fig. 7 Effective disposable income Gini coefficient (1996–2007). Source OECD.Stat




































Fig. 8 Net Foreign Asset position: Spain. Source Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006)
to a lower level relative to the initial level seem to lend support to the prediction of
our model. Capital flows also depend on many other factors which the model fails to
capture. Nevertheless, the downward path of NFA in Fig. 8 confirms the initial inward
flow of capital and the depressed NFA position described above (see Fig. 4). However
empirical data fail to replicate the second phase when capital flows out, increasing
above the initial level. Thus, the actual dynamics of the Gini coefficient and the NFA
position can be partially justified by the fiscal consolidation strategy.
5 Conclusion
By using a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, we simulate the
Spanish consolidation episode that occurred between 1996 and 2007 to assess the
underlying welfare and inequality effects. We use the endogenous cross-section distri-
bution to compute several inequality indexes and we also assess the aggregate welfare
intensity measured as a percentage change of life-time consumption
Our results show a quite impressive positive net welfare gain, representing almost
20 % of life time consumption. However, the transition costs are also significant,
reducing in more than 25 % the potential (gross) welfare gain. According to our
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simulation the final output level increases 16.37 % relative to the initial level. But
the initial fiscal effort depresses strongly the economy: during the first phase, output
decreases 16.17 %, recovering the initial output level only after 6 years.
This upfront recession affects strongly the poorer, as it can be seen through the
Gini index path. However, the wealth and disposable income distributions become
more compressed as the economy moves towards the final steady state equilibrium.
Summing up, in terms ofwelfare there is a slight bias towards thewealthier individuals,
which means that consolidation costs were mostly fell on the poor.
Finally, the empirical data observed during the consolidation period can be partially
explained by our debt-modeling process. The observed disposable income Gini index
path reproduces the humped-shaped curve of the model. As for international flows of
capital, the model reproduces the initial deterioration of the Spanish NFA position.
However, data does not confirm (at least yet) the asset demand recovery and the reversal
in the NFA position, which surpasses the initial steady state level as the economy
evolves to the final steady-state equilibrium.
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